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In a Black-Scholes-Merton model of single name default, instability could be seen as 
the level of volatility that would trigger default, everything else equal. At a portfolio 
level, for instance comprising all credit liabilities of the corporate sector, potential for 
instability could be measured by a credit portfolio loss distribution. For such a loss 
distribution, it should then be possible to define a level of volatility that would trigger 
instability, for instance by producing credit losses in excess of the aggregate capital of 
the banking system. This paper analyses the potential for instability in the Euro area 
by looking at both aggregate and name-level data for the corporate sector. Loss 
distributions are computed under plausible hypotheses for the underlying default, loss 
and correlation parameters, and our conclusion is that aggregate bank capital could 
cover losses at a very high confidence level; in other words, the likelihood of financial 
instability is negligible. However, we identify a sizable degree of concentration in the 
aggregate liabilities of Euro zone non-financial corporations. Significant 
concentration, even at investment grade, augments potential credit losses (measured 
as Credit Value at Risk) in a similar way to a substantial increase in the aggregate 
average default probability or the average asset return correlation. Further analysis is 
warranted in order to assess the level of volatility that could trigger default of a 
“concentrated exposure” and to better understand under which conditions this could 
lead to instability. 
2 1. INTRODUTION: VOLATILITY VS INSTABILITY 
 
Dealing with the topic of Financial Instability is a task of daunting complexity. The 
few academic authors that have taken up the challenge (most notable in recent times 
are Charles Kindleberger and Hyman P. Minsky) have succeeded in devising an initial 
taxonomy of financial crises and their causes. However, most would agree that 
moving beyond classification into a tightly knit and consistent theory of Financial 
Instability is still work in progress. IMF’s twice-yearly issues of the Global Financial 
Stability Report “provide a regular assessment of global financial markets and 
identify potential system weakness that could lead to crises” (IMF 2003). Again, the 
focus is chiefly descriptive, enriched by in-depth analysis of various crisis episodes 
and related policy responses. Many studies posit a connection between episodes of 
high volatility in the prices of financial assets and episodes of financial instability. 
While “volatility, simply put refers to the degree to which prices vary over a certain 
length of time … Financial system instability is often linked to concerns about key 
financial institutions becoming illiquid or failing …” (IMF, 2003). The motivation of 
this paper is to explore a formal, however narrow, link between the related concepts 
of volatility and instability via the Black-Scholes-Merton model (BSM) of default, in 
the version popularised by Moody's|KMV (2003) and RiskMetrics (1997). In the 
BSM model, a company will default whenever the value of its assets falls below the 
nominal value of the liabilities. Everything else equal, an increase in asset volatility 
augments the likelihood of such an occurrence. The attractiveness of the BSM 
framework is that it features a discontinuity (i.e. a default) along a path of increasing 
volatility in asset returns. In a model of single name default, instability could be seen 
as the level of volatility that would trigger default, everything else equal. At an 
aggregate level, the joint process of default of a portfolio of names can be derived by 
their joint asset dynamics. Thus, if one thinks of systemic Financial Instability as 
entailing the joint default of a number of companies and banks, a BSM model of an 
economic system could represent a relevant “laboratory” test for systemic risk. 
 
Gray, Merton and Bodie (2003) have extended the BSM framework to a 
macroeconomic setup. While being more limited in a number of ways, our analysis 
differs in that we utilise explicitly the concept of a loss distribution and we study the 
implications of concentration on financial instability. A portfolio model is first and 
foremost a tool to quantify the likelihood of a given level of losses on a credit 
portfolio, over a definite time horizon. This measure is typically read off a loss 
distribution. If this portfolio is assembled at the level of a single bank, one can derive 
the loss distribution in order to assess the likelihood that the bank will remain solvent 
over the period, which is given by the probability of losses not exceeding the bank’s 
capital and reserves. The same concept can be applied at a macroeconomic level, for 
instance, taking aggregate loans from the financial sector to the corporate sector. The 
resulting loss distribution could be used to evaluate the solvency of the financial 
system as a whole, thus translating the general concept of systemic risk into a less 
general, but also more concrete concept of Financial Instability. While the analysis in 
Gray, Merton and Bodie (2003) encompasses all macroeconomic sectors and 
quantifies the risk of instability at a macroeconomic level, this paper explicitly models 
liabilities issued by the major corporates
1 and banks in the Euro area. By computing 
loss distributions for a specific portfolio, we are able to explore a dimension that, to 
                                                           
1 We use the shorthand noun “corporate/s” in this paper to refer to one/several non-financial 
corporation/s. 
3 the best of our knowledge, has received little attention in the literature, and that is 
concentration. Among recent episodes of single name instability are the LTCM 
debacle and the period following the TMT bubble collapse, including the Enron and 
WorldCom defaults. These were large institutions, with a non-negligible weight on 
either the financial system or an important market or both. We believe that the 
concept of concentration is key when trying to assess the link between volatility and 
instability. Generalized defaults of numerous small actors may weaken, but unlikely 
threaten the financial system, whereas the orderly resolution of the default of one 
single institution, at the center of a large number of financial transactions like LTCM, 
turned out to require the coordinated intervention of major US banks. Portfolio 
models, applied to the economy-wide portfolio of private credit claims not only 
enable quantifying potential losses in a probabilistic way, but also help spotting the 
largest sources of potential losses, the entities about which the largest lumps of credit 
risk are concentrated. 
 
After having hopefully made a case for the use of loss distributions in the analysis of 
systemic risk and the impact of concentration, we need to establish at least a 
suggestive link to the economic implications of volatility and instability. The former 
could impact the real economy because of losses in the wealth of a sector, which can 
in turn affect macroeconomic flows. Financial instability will instead affect 
macroeconomic flows directly. Disruptions in the payment system following bank 
defaults can impair the efficient allocation of resources upon which a modern 
economic system with deep capital markets thrives. Such disruptions will likely 
translate in lower macroeconomic flows. Unlike the destruction of wealth brought 
about by volatility, which could sometimes amount to a mere redistribution within a 
sector, disruptions of economic flows will have direct effects on the level of economic 
activity. While a more detailed analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of the 
paper, the distinction between flows and stocks should be kept in mind when 
interpreting our results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the sample, a 
credit portfolio comprising the largest names in the Euro zone, based on an 
“anonymous” member list of the EuroStoxx50 index, and examines its actuarial 
characteristics using the Expected Loss (EL) measure. In Section 3, we present a 
simplified framework based on a CreditMetrics application of the BSM framework, 
which enables introducing the main Value at Risk (VaR) concepts for analysing 
concentration. In section 4, these concepts are applied to derive measures of the 
solvency of a banking system. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. NAÏVE CONCENTRATION ANALYSIS 
 
It is instructive to begin this study with a standard Expected Loss (EL) calculation. 
This is given by the product of the Exposure at Default (EAD), the Loss Given 
Default (LGD) and the Probability of Default (PD), which are the building block of 
most credit portfolio models and the natural starting point for any analysis of credit 
risk concentration. For the sake of brevity, we illustrate each of these concepts by 
direct application to the sample portfolio. 
 
4 Exposure at Default (EAD) 
 
A breakdown of the EUROSTOXX50 Index at the end of 2001 into its member 
components, after consolidating two companies that are part of the same group, 
provides 49 names representing 49 groups with only minority ties to each other. The 
sample displays high variation in terms of credit quality, as it contains a richer mix 
than the current index, including three speculative grade companies. For each name, 
total debt is defined as in the standardized balance sheet classification available in 
Bloomberg, which excludes deposits in the case of banking names and account 
payable for all corporates. EAD are defined in nominal terms, with only one exposure 
per name, for a total exposure of EUR 3trn. This is possibly an oversimplification, as 
the total debt numbers extracted from Bloomberg comprise a wide variety of 
instruments and maturities. Moreover, there is a question of comparability between 
the total debt of a bank and the analogous measure for a corporate, even if deposits 
and trade credit are excluded. In this respect, however, we are following mainstream 
regulatory practice. 
 
For convenience, total debt issued by the names in the sample is normalized to EUR 
1bn, and we imagine to hold a single instrument issued by each name in proportion to 
the debt in its balance sheet. Figure 1 depicts the nominal holdings, with each member 
identified by its sector and an ordinal number (see Annex 1 and 2 for a full list). The 
sample is highly concentrated, with the largest issuer accounting for over 17% of total 
nominal holdings, and with the top ten issuers representing three quarters of the 
portfolio. A widely used measure of concentration, the equivalent number of assets
2, 
indicates that the actual portfolio of 49 exposures is as concentrated as a portfolio of 
14 identical ones.  
 

































With all major financial exposures in the sample, it is not surprising that over three 
quarters of the portfolio is attributable to either banks or insurance companies, which 
                                                           
2 The equivalent number of assets is defined as the reciprocal of the Herfindhal-Hirshman index, which 
in turn is equal to the sum of the squares of each name’s share in the portfolio. 
5 in Figure 2 have been grouped under the “Financial” sector. The share of the other 
sectors (Communications, Utilities, etc.) amounts to only a handful of percentage 
points. One may thus conclude that, at first sight, debt issued from EUROSTOXX50 
names is highly concentrated both along a name dimension and along a sector 
dimension. The country dimension is less relevant, as it only represents the country of 
incorporation, irrespective of the actual geographical distribution of business. 
However, based on such narrower definition, the portfolio is also concentrated 
geographically, with 40% of the exposure in Germany, 20% in France, 15% in the 
Netherlands, and the remaining part more or less equally split among Italy, Belgium 
and Spain.  
 
 
Figure 2. Nominal composition of the portfolio by sector 
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Loss Given Default (LGD) 
 
There is a general agreement, documented by extensive studies
3, that only a fraction 
of the principal is lost upon default. On the basis of such studies, and the statistics 
reported in Table 1, one cannot reject the standard working hypothesis that LGD has 
been on average of 50% historically for senior unsecured publicly traded debt 
instruments, like bonds. The central estimates are quite similar for bonds, letters of 
credit and receivables and are somewhat lower for loans.  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics from LGD Studies 




Senior Unsecured Bonds  Altman & Kishore [96]   48  27 
Senior Unsecured Bonds  Carty & Leiberman [96]   48  26 
CDS, LC, Receivable  Carty & Leiberman [96]  48  26 
CDS, LC, Receivable  Altman & Kishore [96]   48  27 
Loans/ Commitments  Asarnow & Edwards [95]   65  38 
Loans/ Commitments  Carty & Leiberman [96]  71  21 
Source: RiskMetrics 
 
Additionally, all studies document an important volatility of recoveries across 
different names, periods and samples. Again, one cannot reject the standard working 
hypothesis that the standard deviation of the LGD is 25%. Throughout what follows 
                                                           
3 See for instance, Carty & Leiberman (1996) or Altman & Kishore (1996) on bond recovery and 
Asarnow & Edwars (1995) on recovery for loans and loan commitments. 
6 we assume a uniform average LGD of 50% and a standard deviation of 25%, 
regardless of the type of debt composing the portfolio and regardless of the 
counterpart’s nature. While there is evidence that recovery varies across economic 
sectors and that it is lower for financial institutions than for corporates, we consider 
such refinements outside the scope of the present work. LGD variation over the 
business cycle is instead discussed in section 4. 
 
Rating distribution and Probability of Default (PD) 
 
Following standard practice, and taking advantage of the fact that most names in the 
portfolio issue public debt, relative creditworthiness is measured in terms of long-term 
senior-unsecured issuer ratings as assigned by Moody’s or Standard&Poor’s. Agency 
ratings are a qualitative and ordinal measure of creditworthiness, which is defined in 
quite general terms. For instance, Moody’s defines its ratings scale as follows: 
 
“Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk. Obligations 
rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk. Obligations rated A are 
considered upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk. Obligations rated Baa are subject to 
moderate credit risk. They are considered medium-grade and as such may possess certain speculative 
characteristics. Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject to 
substantial credit risk. Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. 
Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very high credit risk” 
 
For ease of exposition Moody’s notation is used throughout the paper. Figure 3 
depicts the distribution of ratings in the sample, revealing that well over half of the 
exposures are associated to names of high credit quality (Aa or above), as primarily 
determined by exposure to banks and other financial institutions. Over three quarters 
are at least upper-medium grade (A). The small exposure to speculative grade names 
(B) comes from companies that have experienced financial difficulties in recent years. 
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The next step, to associate a PD to each rating for use in credit portfolio analysis, is 
both delicate and controversial. Choice will generally depend on (i) the horizon that is 
most relevant to the issue being analysed; (ii) the degree of discrimination that is 
warranted, given the heterogeneity of the portfolio; (iii) the available data. For 
regulatory purposes, the horizon will be one year; there should be a minimum of 
seven rating grades for non-defaulted borrowers; and data should span a period of at 
least five years. For the purpose of our analysis, criteria (ii) and (iii) will be satisfied 
by using historical estimates of default probabilities associated with letter grades. 
Such estimates are published by the rating agencies, and are typically based on 
historical samples starting in the 1970s. Series going back to the 1920s are also 
7 available, but arguably, they span economic episodes that are not relevant to the 
immediate future
4. Realizing that there might be important differences across 
obligations rated within the same letter grade, in 1983 Moody’s introduced the “rating 
qualifiers” 1, 2 and 3, which are added after the letter grade to obtain an alphanumeric 
rating. For instance, the highest rated obligations within the letter grade Aa are rated 
Aa1, the lowest, Aa3. Historical default rates are also estimated for alphanumeric 
grades; however, the loss of degrees of freedom in estimating 17 instead of 7 PDs 
increases the volatility of central estimates. Default frequencies for alphanumeric 
grades often violate the basic requirement to be increasing along the rating scale.  
 
Concerning the risk horizon, the purposes of this exercise are best served if instead of 
the regulatory standard one-year horizon, a longer one is considered. Table 2 
illustrates the reason for this choice. At a one-year horizon, the cumulative default 
probabilities for Aaa, Aa and A rated names are both negligible and indistinguishable. 
As the risk horizon increases, the number of default observations increases, thus 
rendering the estimates more reliable. Only reaching a three-year horizon the 
probability of default of Aa rated names ceases to be negligible and a clear distinction 
between this class and the two neighbouring ratings emerges. The difference in PD 
across ratings classes becomes more and more marked as the horizon increases, but 
arguably, pushing the horizon beyond 3-5 years will diminish the relevance of the 
study, as the reference sample becomes less and less representative of the Euro zone 
economy.  
 
Table 2. Average Cumulative Default Rates 1970-2002 (Issuer Weighted) 
Fraction of issuers defaulting by the horizon (%) 
Horizon  (years)  1 2 3 4 5 
Aaa  0 0 0  0.04 0.12 
Aa  0.02 0.03 0.07  0.16 0.26 
A  0.02 0.09 0.22  0.36 0.51 
Baa  0.22 0.61 1.08  1.69 2.25 
Ba  1.28 3.51 6.09  8.76 11.36 
B  6.51 14.16  21.03 27.04 32.31 
Caa-C  23.83 37.12 47.43 55.05 60.09 
Investment-Grade  0.08 0.24 0.45  0.72 0.98 
Speculative-Grade  4.99 10.05  14.66 18.67 22.18 
All Corporates  1.59 3.19 4.64  5.9 6.96 
Source: Moody’s 2003. Exhibit 44. 
 
It is noteworthy that default frequencies at a three-year horizon are of the same order 
of magnitude as “worst-case-one-year” default rates. The highest one-year default rate 
was recorded in 2002 for Investment Grade Corporates at 0.49% and in 2001 for 
Speculative Grade ones at 10.60%. As the sample consists mostly of the former, 
taking a three-year cumulative horizon is also representative of how much things did 
go wrong historically in one year over the 1970-2002 period. Most researchers refer to 
average cumulative default rates as “unconditional” default probabilities, since they 
span several business cycles. A “worst-case-one-year” default rate is instead thought 
of having a nature of “conditional” default probability. For instance, the 
aforementioned default rate of 0.49% recorded for investment grade issuers can be 
                                                           
4 One could certainly argue that there is a non-zero probability of a repeat of the Great Depression or a 
World War over the next thirty years, but most would agree that the probability of any such event 
hitting the Euro area over the next two-three years is indeed negligible.  
8 interpreted to be conditional on the phase of the business cycle prevalent in 2002. 
Wilson (1997) has suggested a way in which the PDs used in credit portfolio 
modelling could be expressed as a function of economic conditions. His model could 
be used to derive PDs that are conditional on current economic conditions, and also 
for stress testing that is based on a range of macroeconomic forecasts. These concepts 
are further discussed in section 4. 
 
Expected Loss Analysis (EL) 
 
Under the hypothesis that the default and recovery processes are independent, the EL 
can be computed by simple multiplication of the EAD times the LGD times the PD. 
Its interpretation is of a PD-weighted LGD and it provides a more accurate indicator 
of credit risk concentration than it is the case for nominal exposures. It should be 
noted that PD and LGD fully determine the capital allocation in the latest version of 
the New Basel Capital Accord, Internal Ratings Based Approach (2003, §241). In that 
formula, exactly like in our EL calculation, the LGD enters linearly; capital allocation 
depends instead from the PD in a non-linear, but nevertheless monotone increasing 
relationship. Table 3 compares the EL contributions of each sector to the 
corresponding nominal contributions. Most noteworthy, the financial sector, which 
accounts for 80% of the total nominal exposure, takes up only 20% when weighted by 
its PD. Conversely, the communication sector, whose exposure contribution is only 
6% of the total, accounts for over half of total EL. The latter fact is explained by the 
presence of a normalized EUR 8m exposure to B-rated Communications 1 and 7 as 
well as two large BBB-rated exposures (Communications 2 and 3). The large 
contribution of the Consumer Non-Cyclical Sector (including retailing and pharma) is 
mostly due to a normalized EUR 4m exposure to B-rated Consumer Cyclical 4 in the 
sample. 
 








Communications 1,109,159  51%  6% 
Consumer Noncyclical 441,218  20%  2% 
Financial 436,449  20%  80% 
Utilities 80,570  4%  4% 
Consumer Cyclical  64,143  3%  4% 
Energy 24,193  1%  2% 
Industrial 16,303  1%  1% 
Diversified 12,467  1%  0% 
Basic Materials  4,175  0%  1% 
Total 2,188,677  100%  100% 
 
In relative terms, total EL amounts to slightly over 2% of total nominal exposure. A 
capital allocation based purely on the EL would fall short of current regulatory capital 
requirements
5 and it would amount only to a fraction of the largest exposure in our 
portfolio (recall that the nominal weight of the largest issuer in the portfolio is over 
17%). Also, losses originating from default of any except the smallest exposures 
would be sufficient to wipe out half of such allocation (see Figure 1). This 
                                                           
5 Even considering risk-weighted assets (RWA) of 20% for all financial institutions, average RWA 
would be 80%*20%+20%*100%=36% and regulatory capital 8%*36%~=3%. 
9 shortcoming is due to the fact that EL accounts for neither default correlation among 
exposures, nor the degree of concentration in the portfolio. To correct for the former, 
the proposal under the Basle II Internal Rating Based Approach, introduces an 
analytical formula that de facto augments the PD whenever correlation is non-zero
6. 
Analytical approximations (e.g. the so “granularity adjustment” in Gordy (2002)) 
have also been proposed for portfolios that are not infinitely granular. In the next 
section, these issues are illustrated via numerical simulation. 
 
 
3. THE EFFECT OF CORRELATION AND CONCENTRATION 
 
Loss distributions for credit portfolio risk are highly skewed and with fat tails, due to 
the relative infrequency of default events and to the fact that in unfavourable 
economics situations defaults tend to occur jointly. A model of correlation is needed 
to incorporate joint default risk in our sample portfolio. Once such a model is 
established, it is possible to compute a loss distribution by numerical methods and to 
discuss a set of portfolio-based concentration measures. A number of frameworks for 
this type of analysis have been proposed over the last few years and are surveyed in 
Saunders and Allen (2002). Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998) demonstrate that, subject 
to proper parameterisation, most frameworks could be harmonized to yield similar 
results. We rely on their argument to choose the model that is simplest to calibrate and 
implement, so that attention can be focussed on the results of the computations. 
 
A correlation model « à la CreditMetrics » 
 
Within the BSM framework, default occurs when negative asset returns bring the 
asset value below the nominal value of liabilities. The CreditMetrics methodology 
calibrates asset returns as a function of normally distributed equity returns. In 
practice, it is assumed that returns for each obligor are determined by an idiosyncratic 
factor as well as one or more stock market indexes. In this paper, each obligor is 
associated to only one such index; for instance, Financial 10 is mapped to the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Banks Index for its country of incorporation, 
while Financial 14 is mapped to MSCI Banks Index for a different country. The asset 
correlation between these two banks will depend on the correlation between the two 
stock market indexes as well as the weights of each respective idiosyncratic factor. 
Following the methodology suggested in the CreditMetrics (1997 and 2003) 
documentation, we determine the latter weight as an inverse function of the size of the 
obligor, measured by its total assets. Annex 1 contains the full list of obligors, their 
total assets, and the weight of the stock index mappings (measured in terms of the R-
squared in a univariate regression). On average, asset correlation across obligors in 
the sample is substantial, of the order of 40%, as one would expect, due to the fact 
that equity returns across blue chips in the Euro area are highly correlated. Once asset 
returns are thus calibrated, the value of the default barrier is inferred as the percentile 
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, where Φ  represents the cumulative function 
for the standard normal distribution and 
1 − Φ  its inverse, and ρ  the average asset correlation in the 
portfolio. It is easy to see that, in the presence of zero correlation the formula returns PD (and the Basel 
formula reduces to a multiple of the EL). The result is greater than PD, for positive correlation. 
10 of the asset return distribution corresponding to the PD associated to each obligor’s 
rating. Thus, default correlation is ultimately driven by a modified correlation of 
equity index returns.  
 
Figure 4. Horizon Value Distribution 
 
 
Based on this model, Figure 4 plots the Horizon Value Distribution, which is the 
complement of the Loss Distribution to the nominal value of the portfolio. The mean 
value of the loss distribution is the one already discussed and obtained by subtracting 
the Mean Portfolio Value from the nominal value of the portfolio. The percentiles, 
also know as Value at Risk (VaR) are obtained as the difference between the 
corresponding percentiles of the Horizon Value Distribution and the Mean Portfolio 
Value. The VaR (in loss terms) at a 99% confidence is estimated at EUR 20,796,782 
± 3%. Due to simulation error, the VaR is estimated slightly less precisely as the 
confidence level increases
7, yet the central estimate grows to approximately EUR 34m 
at a 99.5% confidence level and EUR 142m at 99.9%. 
 
Sector and name concentration 
 
Consider any interval in the loss distribution (the complement to nominal value of the 
histogram pictured in Figure 4). It measures the frequency of all scenarios producing 
total losses in such an interval. The average loss associated with a given obligor 
across all of these scenarios measures its contribution to total loss in that interval, also 
called VaR contribution. Finger and Xiao (2003) explain how this computation could 
be accomplished numerically. Looking at VaR contributions at different levels of 
confidence enables building further intuition on the main sources of credit risk in the 
sample. Figure 5 presents the breakdown by sector at different levels of confidence. 
While, as already discussed, the relative EL contribution of the Financial sector is 
only a quarter of its nominal EAD, its importance grows moving forward into the tails 
                                                           
7 The results have been obtained by using importance sampling techniques and 5,000,000 repetitions in 
the CreditManager software by RiskMetrics. See Finger and Xiao (2003) for details on importance 
sampling. 
11 of the loss distribution. At a 99.9% confidence level, the Financial sector represents 
approximately 90% of the total Value at Risk. 
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The explanation is straightforward, but nevertheless quite central to the understanding 
of systemic risk. As loss scenarios are ordered by increasing loss and decreasing 
likelihood along the distribution, one will encounter defaults of relatively riskier 
borrowers at low confidence levels. At higher confidence levels, less risky exposures 
begin to default. At very high confidence levels joint default begin to occur. Systemic 
risk is encountered at these higher percentiles in the loss distribution. This reasoning, 
however, only holds if no single obligor dominates the portfolio. 
 
Table 4. Top VaR contributors at different confidence levels 
Top ten contributions  VaR 99.5%  Top ten contributions  VaR 99.9% 
Communications 2  3,333,232  Financial 8  67,372,534 
Communications 3  3,259,372  Financial 9  10,902,895 
Communications 7  3,224,454  Financial 10  8,462,587 
Financial 11  2,691,770  Financial 1  6,903,279 
Financial 14  2,271,389  Financial 12  5,322,734 
Consumer Cyclical 1  1,824,415  Financial 11  5,235,778 
Financial 3  1,560,210  Financial 15  5,096,058 
Consumer Noncyclical 4  1,422,554  Financial 3  4,680,736 
Utilities 2  1,050,698  Financial 14  3,862,672 
Financial 1  972,450  Communications 7  2,336,584 
Total 33,984,931  Total  141,982,236 
 
An analysis of VaR contribution by name (see Table 4 and also Annex 2) clarifies the 
point further. The top contributors to the VaR99% and VaR99.5% are Baa-rated 
Communications 2 and 3 and B-rated Communications 7 with a total normalized 
exposure of less than EUR 50m. The top contributor to the VaR99.9% is instead a 
bank, A-rated, but with the largest normalized exposure in the portfolio of EUR 
12 170m
8. Whenever a default scenario involving such a large exposure is drawn, losses 
are “pushed to the tails” of the distribution. To understand why, let us recall that the 
VaR99.5% amounts to EUR 34m, while on average, LGD on this exposure will be 
EUR 85m. Thus, most of the increase from VaR99.5% to VaR 99.9% (i.e. from EUR 
34m to EUR 142m) is explained by the additional EUR 85m of potential losses on the 
largest exposure in the sample. The intuition is further reinforced by observing that 
the second largest contributor at a 99.9% confidence, also a bank, is Aa-rated but with 
LGD that is only half the former. It seems that the highest tail contributions tend to 
come either from very large exposures, independently of their creditworthiness, or 
from highly rated exposures, everything else equal. There is thus something 
fundamentally different about large concentrations, that is not easily captured by any 
single capital allocation measure, but that instead requires in-depth analysis of the 
tails of the distribution at different confidence levels. The assumption of a granular 
portfolio, underlying the capital requirements proposed in the Consultative Paper on 
the New Basel Capital Accord (2003), may thus warrant reconsideration
9.  
 
Other than exposure size and high ratings, an additional reason for the 
disproportionate weight of the financial sector at the highest confidence level is that 
average return correlation is significantly higher between financial institutions (60%) 
than it is within other sectors. This is a mechanical consequence of the CreditMetrics 
correlation model, where the larger the obligor the higher its weight in any given 
stock market index and consequently, the higher the systematic component of its 
returns. Higher return correlation increases the relative likelihood of infrequent events 
like joint defaults. Again, this implies that regulatory capital may need to consider 
contributions at different confidence levels. 
 
 
4. MEASURING THE SOLVENCY OF A BANKING SYSTEM. DOES 
CONCENTRATION MATTER? 
 
Overall, the 49 names in our sample have outstanding debt (excluding deposits) in 
excess of EUR 3trn. The sample contains nine Aa-rated banks (Financials 3, 6-7; 9-
12, 14 and 15) and two A-rated ones (Financials 8 and 14). Collectively, these banks 
have total capital in excess of EUR 300bn, that is, in excess of 10% of nominal 
exposure. Such an order of magnitude is comparable to the estimates of risk computed 
in the previous section, where we found that the VaR at a 99.5% (99.9%) confidence 
level (over a three-year horizon) is approximately 3% (14%) of the normalized 
portfolio. Does this finding allow one to infer that the largest banks in the Euro area 
are solvent at a confidence level that is higher than 99.5% but lower then 99.9%, that 
is, there is more than one (but less then five) chance(s) in one thousand that 
cumulative losses on the portfolio over a three year period (or over one worst case 
year) will exceed their aggregate capital at EUR 300bn?  
 
While the above reasoning can only be taken as suggestive, one could argue that it is 
both too conservative and not conservative enough. One the one hand, the portfolio of 
these banks is much more diversified, as it extends well beyond the EUROSTOXX50 
                                                           
8 Since a considerable fraction of the liabilities of the bank in question is constituted by Aaa rated 
covered bonds, our results considerably overstate the concentration effect at this level of confidence. 
Once more, we should emphasise that any reference to a specific name is for illustrative purposes only. 
9 The point is made explicitly in the IMF Staff Comments on the April 2003 Consultative Paper (2003).  
13 names and, additionally, there are banks and capital market investors outside the 
EUROSTOXX50 which share the risk on these large corporates, either in a direct 
form or in the form of a credit derivative. This is particularly true since the portfolio is 
largely composed by bank bonds, a substantial part of which is held by the household 
sector. On the other hand, the portfolio of a specific institution might be more 
concentrated than the average on a risky corporate, contributing disproportionately to 
systemic risk. Aggregate flow-of-funds date provide some additional elements. In its 
Monthly Bulletin, the European Central Bank publishes statistics on loans to the 
government, non-financial corporations and households. At the end of the second 
quarter of 2003, total loans outstanding exceeded EUR 8trn, with EUR 1trn taken by 
the government sector, and the remaining EUR 7trn split halfway between the 
corporate and household sector. Of the total loans, over EUR 7trn had been extended 
by Euro Area Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI). Interestingly, outstanding bonds, 
issued by the corporate sector, amount to little over EUR 0.5trn. The total capital and 
reserves of the aforementioned MFI exceed EUR 1trn. Thus, if one omits loans 
granted outside the Euro area, capital and reserves cover approximately 14% of the 
outstanding face value of MFI loans. An interesting question to ask is at which level 
of confidence such capital and reserves would be sufficient to ensure solvency of the 
banking system taken as an aggregate. We believe there is a meaningful way in which 
such a question could be addressed. For the sake of illustration, analysis is restricted 
to the corporate sector, leaving retail and inter-bank exposures as a topic for further 
research. The first subsection below presents the main argument, while the second 
sub-section discusses the robustness of the results under stress tested parameter 
values. 
 
Should concentration make a difference to the capital requirements? 
 
Participating banks to the several Basle II Quantitative Impact Studies have been 
asked to estimate capital requirements using the IRB formulas, that is, under the 
assumption that their portfolios were infinitely granular. One should be able to 
perform a similar exercise, based on aggregate data from the ECB Bulletin, by 
properly segment the total exposure, for instance by country and by rating class, and 
to obtain a reasonable estimate of the aggregate loss distribution. However, 
overlooking the presence of potential concentration in the credit aggregates might 
lead to a systematic underestimation of aggregate risk. Together, the thirty-eight 
corporates in our sample have outstanding debt close to EUR 1trn, so that they 
represent approximately one quarter of total corporate debt outstanding, including 
both loans and bonds. The largest debt, excluding banks, is Aa-rated Financial 3’s at 
EUR 230bn (approximately 5% of a total corporate debt of EUR 4trn), followed by 
A-rated Consumer Cyclical 1 with EUR 80m and Baa-rated Communications 3 with 
EUR 70m. Some further exploration thus appears to be justified. 
 
In order to assess the potential impact from concentration, we fix the attention on total 
corporate sector debt, which, for illustrative purposes, we quantify at EUR 4trn and 
compute loss distributions under several hypotheses for average PD, LGD, and asset 
correlation. Loss distributions are initially computed under the assumption that the 
portfolio is infinitely granular, using an approximation analogous to the IRB formula, 
14 which is built in the CreditManager software
10. Subsequently, we explicitly model the 
exposure represented by the thirty-eight corporate names in the EuroStoxx50 and 
compare the resulting loss distributions at various levels of confidence to assess the 
impact of concentration. 
 
The parameters for the infinitely granular portfolio are calibrated as follows: 
 
•  PD. The recently released Moody’s study “Default and Recovery Rates of 
European Corporate Bond Issuers, 1985–2002” estimates an average default 
rate of 2.9% for all corporates in 2002, the worst year in the sample. While 
cumulative default rates are not yet available for European corporates, the 
study observes that one-year transition matrices for European and US bond 
issuers are quite similar. Thus, consistently with our hypothesis derived from 
casual observation of US data, that “worst-case-one-year” default rates are of 
the same order of magnitude as three-year cumulative default rates, we 
estimate average credit quality of European bond issuers to be lower then Baa 
(3y default rate of 1.08%) but higher than Ba (3y default rate of 6.09%). For 
illustrative purposes, two sets of simulations are run using the IRB formula, 
the first one based on a PD of 3% and the last on 6%. The latter, higher level is 
possibly more reflective of companies that do not issue public debt, but only 
have access to bank credit.  
•  Asset correlation. Based on Moody’s¦KMV data for listed European 
companies and calibrating loss distributions for a single factor, Lopez (2002) 
estimates correlation as low as 10.0% and as high as 22.5% depending on the 
size of the companies as well as their PD. This range is well below the average 
correlation applied to our EuroStoxx 50 portfolio, but consistent with the fact 
that the sector includes obligors of different sizes and from diverse countries. 
Lopez (2002) also finds that lower asset correlations tend to be associated to 
higher PDs. Applying the most recent IRB formula for correlation to our 
chosen range of PD between 3% and 6% one finds asset correlation as high as 
15% and as low as 9%, respectively. For illustrative purposes, we tabulate two 
round levels of correlation (10% and 20%). 
•  LGD. The working hypothesis of 50% average LGD, with a standard 
deviation of 25% is maintained.  
 
The first figure in each cell in the first row of Table 5 reports the VaR
11 estimates for 
an infinitely granular portfolio of EUR 4trn. The second figure in each cell of the 
same table, obtained by assuming that a loan pool of approximately EUR 3bn plus our 
sample of 38 non-bank obligors make up the total portfolio of EUR 4trn, should 
gauge the impact of concentration. The < or the > sign separates the two figures, the 
                                                           
10 Xiao and Finger (2003) demonstrate that, with proper parameterisation, the IRB-type formulas 
enable approximating the loss distribution for a portfolio with a large enough number of homogeneous 
obligors. 
11 The CreditManager software requires input of the number of exposures comprising a loan pool, but 
Xiao & Finger (2003) find that a couple thousand exposures are sufficient to ensure convergence of the 
loss distribution, under most parameter values. Estimates of the equivalent number of corporate 
exposures for the Euro area would probably yield an order of magnitude of at least several hundred 
thousands, which is well beyond the number needed for convergence. As a consequence we arbitrarily 
set the number of exposures at 2,000. Sensitivity tests run using 5,000 and 10,000 exposures confirm 
the intuition.  
15 former indicating an increase in VaR at any given confidence level. Several 
observations can be made on the basis of this simple experiment.  
 
Table 5. Concentration effects in the European Corporate Sector  
  PD = 3%  PD = 6% 
  VaR99 VaR99.5 VaR99.9 VaR99 VaR99.5  VaR99.9 
% 10 = ρ   168<170  202<208 278<323 268>246 317>297  419<434 
% 20 = ρ   288>262 357>326 511>504 446>387 534>463 719>662 
 
Firstly, as the average credit quality of the EuroStoxx50 sample is much higher than 
the credit quality in the loan pool
12, and this is reflected in the assumption of lower 
PDs, no major increases are observed and actually the VaR decreases in a majority of 
cases. Still, the joint effect of concentration and of a higher average correlation
13 is 
evident further into the tails of the loss distribution, especially in the first row of the 
table, corresponding to a less correlated pool. The largest effect is found in the case of 
a 3% PD for the pool, at a 99.9% confidence level, where the Value at Risk increases 
by 15% from EUR 278bn to EUR 323. It is also interesting to notice that, always at a 
99.9% confidence level, despite having substituted higher rated names for EUR 1trn 
of exposure otherwise at a 6% PD, the VaR still increases by almost 4%, from EUR 
419m to EUR 434m. 
 
Secondly, VaR always decrease at the higher level of pool correlation as reflected in 
the bottom row of Table 5. Intuitively this is because a higher level of correlation 
produces thick tails in the loss distribution of the loan pool. The impact of name 
concentration on tails that are already thick appears to be negligible. Note, however, 
that, in the case of an average pool PD of 3%, and at a 99.9% confidence level, the 
VaR decreases by less than 2%, from EUR 511m to EUR 504m, a further 
demonstration that the higher concentration and correlation among EUROSTOXX50 
names more than compensates their lower PDs. We should also note that the second 
row of Table 5 might be less representative of actual economic conditions. To see 
why, one could compare a VaR of EUR 288bn at a 99% level of confidence with total 
capital and reserves of Euro area banks, amounting to approximately EUR 1trn. Even 
assuming a cumulative default rate of 3% for the pool over a three-year period, in the 
presence of an average correlation of 20%, there would be a chance in one hundred 
that over a quarter of total capital and reserves of Euro banks are wiped out. This 
fraction grows to half, at the same confidence level, if one considers a PD of 6% for 
the pool. 
 
For this reason, let us focus on the more plausible assumption of a 10% average 
correlation. At this level, it is easier to distinguish the impact of concentration from 
the higher correlation within EUROSTOXX50 names. Items (i) and (ii) in the first 
row of Table 6 report the VaR figures from the first row of Table 5, for the case of a 
3% average cumulative default probability for the pool. The corresponding items in 
the second and third row are the contributions from the pool and from the most 
concentrated exposure, the latter being largest non-bank exposure in the index, at 
                                                           
12 If one excludes B-rated Communications 1 and 7 and Consumer Non-cyclical 4, the average PD is 
close to the average cumulative 3-year default rate for investment grade names. Including those, the 
average PD is close to the average cumulative 3-year default  rate for Baa-rated names. 
13 Average bilateral assets return correlation among the 38 corporate names is of the order of 40%. 
16 EUR 230m, accounting for over 5% of the total portfolio of EUR 4trn. Recall that the 
pool accounts for three quarters of the total portfolio. At the actual rating for the 
largest exposure (Aa), VaR contribution from the pool is close to three quarters, in 
line with its nominal contribution.  
 
Table 6. Comparative static, (i) EUR 4trn Loan Pool, EUR 3trn Loan Pool with 
EuroStoxx50 names and (ii) largest exposure rated Aa or (iii) Baa 
% 10 = ρ ; 
PD = 3% 
VaR99% VaR99.5%  VaR99.9% 
Absolute 
value  (i) 168< (ii) 170< (iii) 208  202 < 208 < 281  278 < 323 < 408 
Loan pool 




(i) 0% (ii) 0% (iii) 8%  0% 0% 17%  0% 1% 26% 
Note: 
% 20 = ρ ; 
PD = 6% 
(i) 446 > (ii) 387 < (iii) 426  534 > 463 < 515  719 > 662 < 735 
 
Furthermore, due to its high rating, the largest exposure barely shows any contribution 
to the VaR except at the highest confidence level of 99.9%; still, at 1% this VaR 
contribution is much lower than its nominal contribution of almost 6%. Suppose, 
however, that the largest exposure were rated Baa instead of Aa
14, still at investment 
grade and a much higher credit quality than the pool. One should not think of this as a 
downgrade but, rather, of an exercise of comparative static, with two different 
portfolios being compared. There would be now a probability of slightly over 1% (see 
Table 2) that a loss of EUR 115bn (50% of the exposure of EUR 230bn) could be 
added to the portfolio. Items (iii) in Table 6 show that such a concentration makes its 
partial impact felt already at a 99% confidence level, with an increase in the VaR of 
25%, from EUR 168bn to EUR 208bn. The full impact of the additional loss is instead 
visible at the 99.9% confidence level, with an increase of 50% in the VaR, to EUR 
408m, relative to the case without concentration. The second and third rows of Table 
5 indicates that the VaR contribution of the loan pool falls from 69% at a 99% 
confidence level, to only 53% at 99.9%, while contribution from the largest exposure 
rises from 8% to 26%. At this higher level of confidence, the lower rating of has a 
similar effect as doubling the average PD, as it may be seen by comparison with the 
cell in the upper-right corner of Table 5 (EUR 419m), or a substantial increase in the 
average correlation. A similar intuition comes from the last row of Table 6, which 
could be read to indicate that a lower rating of the largest concentrating exposure 
yields similar value at risk as the original full loan pool in the high-PD high-
correlation environment. Our third comment is that, even at investment grade level, a 
nominal concentration of 5% of the total Euro area corporate portfolio has a 
considerable impact on the total VaR. Indeed concentration seems to matter at 
systemic level! 
 
The fourth and final point is that, in none of the cases considered above VaR 
estimates exceed the level of overall capital and reserves of the Euro area banking 
                                                           
14 This hypothesis is for illustrative purposes only.  
17 system (approximately EUR 1trn) and that estimates are closest only at levels of 
confidence that are 99.9% or higher. The next subsection tests the robustness of this 
result, by considering stress scenarios for the main parameter values. 
 
Cyclical effects and parameter calibration 
 
While the illustrative purpose of our exercise is served by the simplest of 
assumptions, and the main conclusions are unlikely to be overturned by a more 
sophisticated parameterization, recent research on (i) the probabilities of default, (ii) 
the asset return correlations and (iii) the recovery rate is worth discussing. In 
particular, we should consider implications of the extensive literature, surveyed in 
Allen and Saunders (2003) and Altman, Resti and Sironi (2003), which has studied 
interrelated parameter variation over the business cycle. The aforementioned 
conclusion, that bank reserves for the Euro area are sufficient to cover losses at all but 
quasi-certain confidence levels, is found to be robust under a wider range of 
parameters as suggested in the literature. 
 
Unconditional vs conditional probabilities of default 
 
We have tabulated results for PD levels (a low level of 3% and a high level of 6%) 
that are based on historical default frequencies for European non-financial rated 
corporates. The assumptions are consistent with three-year cumulative default 
frequencies as well as worst-year frequencies. According to Moody’s global statistics, 
three-year average cumulative default frequencies for all rated bonds amounted to 
4.65% in the 1920-2003 period, 4.71% in 1970-2003 and 6.06% during the latest 
cycle (1994-2003). The corresponding figure for annual default frequencies (post 
1970) attained the maximum value in 2001 globally and for the US, respectively at 
3.8% and 4.7%, and in 2002 for European names, at 2.9%. In “dollar-weighted” 
terms, the global maximum was 5.29%, again in 2001. This long historical record 
supports our chosen range of PDs. 
 
Average cumulative default frequencies are typically interpreted as “unconditional” 
default probabilities as opposed to year-by-year default frequencies, which are 
“conditional” on the macroeconomic environment in a given year. With particular 
reference to default time series for speculative grade ratings, both Wilson (1997) and 
Moody’s (1999) are able to fit regressions with very high R-squares, explaining 
default rates for speculative names in terms of a parsimonious set of variables 
(macroeconomic in Wilson (1997), both macroeconomic and rating variables in 
Moody’s (1999)). An even more parsimonious characterization is provided by 
Moody’s¦KMV EDF methodology, where default frequencies are expressed a non-
parametric fit to “distance-to-default” measures, in turn derived from a Black-
Scholes-Merton setup (see Moody’s¦KMV (2003)). These methods yield “forward-
looking” default probabilities and at a first look, one might be tempted to dismiss our 
results on grounds that we are using unconditional and backward looking default 
probabilities instead of conditional, forward looking ones. Such a dismissal would be 
only superficially correct, for at least three sets of reasons. Firstly, our assumed range 
includes worst-year PDs, which are by their nature conditional on the economic 
environment of the year in which they are produced. Secondly, long-term cumulative 
averages are conditional on long-term averages for the explanatory variables. Thirdly, 
even if we were to employ a formal model of conditional default probabilities, as long 
18 as such a model is estimated on the historical period and on the available data, 
predicted default frequencies will be in the range that has been historically observed. 
 
A more serious concern to be addressed is whether the economic environment that is 
implicitly assumed by our calculations (i.e. worst year since 1970s or average year 
since the 1920s) provides a satisfactory characterization of future credit risks. If one 
looks for worst-year default frequencies all the way back to the 1920s, a maximum 
value of 8.4% is recorded for all corporates, presumably in the late twenties or early 
thirties
15. This should be interpreted as being conditional on a severe recession 
coupled with a prolonged stock market crash, an extreme monetary tightening and 
bank runs. Such conditions have neither being repeated since, nor are representative 
of the average economic environment underlying the average cumulative defaults. For 
the sake of illustration, one could re-run simulations for a fully granular portfolio in 
the presence of a 9% PD and assuming a 20% asset correlation. The VaR at a 99.9% 
attains EUR 849 bn, still short of total capital and reserve of the Euro area banking 
system. 
 
Asset vs default correlation 
 
The assumed levels for asset correlation, a low level of 10% and a high level of 20% 
are not out of line with available estimates over a long time horizon. Moody’s¦KMV 
(2002) estimates median asset return correlation of approximately 20% for Utility 
firms in their global database of listed companies, 18% for the largest Industrial firms 
and 10% for all Industrial firms. Considering that the European Corporate sector is 
mostly composed of unlisted companies, which are likely to be smaller and less 
correlated, the assumed range appears to be conservative enough. Similar 
considerations apply to the correlation model “à la CreditMetrics” applied to 
EuroStoxx50 companies. This yields a median asset correlation in excess of 40% for 
the 38 corporate names, which is, if anything too conservative
16.  
 
What, however, matters for computing a loss distribution is not asset, but rather 
default correlation, and the latter depends on both the former and the assumed PD 
level. Under jointly normally distributed assets returns, the default correlation 
between any two identical obligors is approximately 3%, for PD=3% and asset 
correlation of 10% and it grows to approximately 6%, for PD=6% and asset 
correlation of 20%. Based on the S&P default database and on the period 1981-2001, 
De Servigny and Renault (2003) estimate an average default correlation of 0.1% and 
1.7% annually and respectively for US investment grade and speculative grade names. 
Using the same data on the period 1981-1999, Nagpal and Bahar (2001) had 
previously found a default correlation of 0.02% and respectively 1.08% for 
investment grade and speculative grade names at a one-year horizon, growing to 
0.29% and 5.50% over a seven-year horizon. Zhou (2001), consistently with Lucas 
(1995), estimates a 6% default correlation between Ba rated companies at a two-year 
horizon
17. Since average cumulative default frequencies for all corporates are 
                                                           
15 Moody’s (2004), Exhibit 25 - Annual Global Issuer-Weighted Default Rate Descriptive Statistics, 
1920-2003. 
16 These levels result from applying the model in Finger and Xiao (2003). The logical concern that 
overestimating correlation could lead to a similar overestimation of concentration was addressed by the 
comparative static in Table 6.  
17 Unfortunately, Zhou’s (2001) does not provide estimates over a three-year horizon for Ba names. 
19 typically found to be lower but close to the corresponding frequencies for Ba-rated 
names, one could consider these findings to provide an upper bound. In conclusion, 
the default correlation ranging between 3% and 6% that is implicit in our analysis 
appears significantly more conservative than justified available historical experience. 
 
Anecdotic evidence is still often cited that both equity correlation and default 
correlation increase during downturns. To gain a quantitative insight on the 
implications of this claim, we have run an infinitely granular EUR 4trn portfolio 
under a PD of 9% and an asset correlation of 30%, both extreme, but plausible in a 
depression scenario. Default correlation levels are much higher, at least of the order of 
15%. We find that losses at a confidence level of 99.9% exceed EUR 1trn, while they 
are still well below at a 99.5% level. In other words, only a truly depressed scenario, 
characterized by both high PDs and abnormally high asset correlation could endanger 
solvency of the Euro area banking system on aggregate; and, even then, only with a 
probability of one-in-a-thousand times. 
 
Countercyclical Loss Given Default 
 
If one measures LGD from distressed bond values following a default event, it is only 
natural to find a strong positive correlation driven by the business and credit cycle. 
Moody’s (2004) documents a long-term average recovery rate of 40% on corporate 
bonds in the period 1982-2003, with peak levels close to 50% in 1987 and again in 
1997, and troughs below 30% in 1990 and again in 2000 and 2001. Altman, Sironi 
and Resti (2002) study in detail the determinant of this relationship and its 
implications on regulatory capital. 
 
To examine the potential impact of this dynamics on our results, we apply the same 
test performed by Altman, Sironi and Resti (2002), who use “a second-degree 
polynomial to model the link between LGDs and empirical default rates, so that LGD 
is 50% when default rates are at their 20-year average (2%), LGD is 60% when 
default rates hit their 20-year maximum (5%) and LGD is 40% when default rates hit 
their 20-year low (0%)”. If an average LGD of 60% is used to replicate Table 5 and 6 
above (while keeping constant the standard deviation of LGD), all percentiles of the 
loss distribution increase by 10%, with none of the key findings being affected. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Significant concentration, even at investment grade, augments potential credit losses 
(measured as Credit Value at Risk) in a similar way to a substantial increase in the 
aggregate average default probability or the average asset return correlation in a credit 
portfolio. We are however sceptical about presence of any systemic threat in the Euro 
area. Firstly, aggregate capital and reserves of the Euro zone banking system should 
cover potential losses at a very high confidence level under normal economic 
conditions. Secondly, having heuristically demonstrated that concentration does have 
an impact on the capital requirements of the banking sector, one should also recognise 
that such an impact was measured only in terms of “potential” rather than “actual” 
losses. Thirdly, even when highly concentrated defaults occur in practice, like it has 
been the case over the past business cycle, the ability of the banking system to spread 
losses across different institutions, including sellers of credit protection outside the 
20 banking sector, is such that the solidity of the system should still be preserved. Thus, 
if only a fraction of the Euro zone banks’ capital is at risk, and such a risk only comes 
with a small probability, the likelihood of systemic insolvency has to be limited.  
 
A number of caveats qualify the aforementioned. Firstly, the analysis is greatly 
simplified and it relies on standardized parameter calibration. A recent assessment of 
the state of the art in estimating PDs and especially correlations (Koyluoglu, Wilson 
and Yague 2003) makes a strong case for being humble about achievements to date. 
Secondly, historical, backward looking default probabilities and correlations are at the 
base of our model. In a full application of the BSM framework, both default 
probabilities and correlations are determined by the corporate asset values and by 
their volatility in a forward-looking way. Thirdly, one needs embedding the problem 
within a macroeconomic framework. There is a tight relationship between default 
rates and macroeconomic variables (Wilson 1997), suggesting that one should be able 
to embed default dynamics in a macroeconomic model, via explicit modelling of 
corporate asset values. The idea has been expressed in a different and more general 
context by Tobin (1980, 1992), whose lifelong work was centred on understanding the 
interaction between asset stocks, assets flows and macroeconomic activity in the 
presence of uncertainty. 
 
The interest of the latter exercise would be to model the borderline between a 
situation that is not threatening (e.g. a circumscribed corporate or banking default 
episode) and a system-wide financial crisis. Within the BSM framework for credit 
risk analysis, such borderline is measured in terms of volatility. High levels of 
volatility translate into higher probability that asset values will fall below the default 
barrier for a higher number of obligors; these higher potential losses in turn increase 
uncertainty and further depress asset prices. Along a path of increasing volatility, 
losses at higher levels of confidence will be realized. However, the impact will be 
radically different in a concentrated portfolio from a granular one. In a granular 
portfolio, losses will build up gradually. In a concentrated portfolio, one might 
observe large losses in correspondence of defaults from concentrated exposures, along 
a path of increasing volatility. Thus, instability will be more likely in an economy 
characterized by concentrated credit risk than in one where credit risk is more 
granular, everything else equal. In the absence of significant concentration, and in the 
presence of well functioning automatic stabilisers, corporate insolvencies associated 
with an economic downturn may weaken the banking sector and affect the wealth of 
bondholders and shareholders. Presumably this will lead to increased precautionary 
savings and lower consumption. Negative pressure on consumption will also derive 
from the likely temporary upsurge in unemployment; but this negative effect on 
aggregate demand will likely be softened by higher public expenditure for 
unemployment benefits. What if instead a large concentrated default were to occur on 
top of economic conditions characterized by higher default rates and higher 
correlation? Such an episode would be more likely to trigger insolvency in the 
banking sector, which, other than further destroying accumulated financial wealth, 
would also likely disrupt resource allocation and impact economic flows.  
 
Progress in analysing these questions is well under way. Regulators, Statistical 
Agencies and Rating Agencies are devoting important resources to the task of 
collecting and analysing credit risk data. While these studies have to date been chiefly 
employed in business applications, an increasing number of economists in various 
21 institutions is focusing on credit risk and financial instability. Notably, Gray, Merton 
and Bodie (2003) have initiated the extension of contingent claim analysis from the 
corporate sector to a wider macroeconomic framework. Dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models developed for monetary policy analysis now often include 
financial asset dynamics. Some of these models might suffer from aggregation 
fallacies and their empirical application is still quite limited, but clearly have the 
potential to take up the challenge. 
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24 ANNEX I – EUROSTOXX 50 SAMPLE DATA (figures in EUR bn) 
Name Rating  Exposure MSCI  Index (distinct by country of 





Financial 8  A  549   ... Banks  678  92% 
Financial 9  Aa  298   ... Banks  710  92% 
Financial 11  Aa  250   ... Banks  350  88% 
Financial 1  Aa  232   ... Diversified Financials  556  91% 
Financial 3  Aa  230   ... Insurance  852  92% 
Financial 10  Aa  218   ... Banks  758  92% 
Financial 12  Aa  181   ... Diversified Financials  716  92% 
Financial 15  Aa  160   ... Banks  501  90% 
Financial 7  Aa  114   ... Banks  324  88% 
Financial 6  Aa  110   ... Banks  279  87% 
Financial 14  A  88   ... Banks  204  85% 
Consumer Cyclical 1  A  79   ... Automobiles & Components  187  84% 
Communications 3  Baa  71   ... Telecommunication Services  107  80% 
Financial 16  Aa  71   ... Banks  213  85% 
Communications 2  Baa  63   ... Telecommunication Services  125  81% 
Consumer Cyclical 3  A  46   ... Automobiles & Components  109  80% 
Utilities 5  A  35   ... Utilities  84  77% 
Utilities 4  A  30   ... Utilities  100  79% 
Communications 6  A  27   ... Telecommunication Services  67  75% 
Utilities 3  A  26   ... Utilities  68  75% 
Utilities 1  A  25   ... Utilities  113  80% 
Utilities 2  Baa  24   ... Utilities  48  72% 
Consumer Noncyclical 7  A  20   ... Food, Beverage & Tobacco  45  71% 
Communications 7  B  20   ... Utilities  69  76% 
Communications 5  Baa  19   ... Telecommunication Services  14  56% 
Energy 1  Aa  16   ... Energy  66  75% 
Financial 5  A  14   ... Insurance  445  90% 
Consumer Noncyclical 4  B  13   ... Retailing  25  64% 
Consumer Cyclical 2  Baa  12   ... Household & Personal Products  30  66% 
Industrial 3  Aa  12   ... Consumer Durables & Apparel  78  77% 
Energy 2  Baa  12   ... Energy  38  69% 
Consumer Noncyclical 2  A  12   ... Retailing  39  69% 
Energy 3  Aaa  11   ... Energy  87  78% 
Financial 2  A  10   ... Diversified Financials  238  86% 
Basic Materials 3  A  10   ... Pharmaceuticals & Biotech  42  70% 
Industrial 1  A  8   ... Materials  30  66% 
Financial 4  A  8   ... Insurance  234  86% 
Diversified 1  Baa  7   ... France  21  61% 
Industrial 2  Baa  7   ... Technology Hardware & Equip  32  67% 
Communications 1  B  6   ... Technology Hardware & Equip  26  64% 
Consumer Noncyclical 3  A  6   ... Food, Beverage & Tobacco  16  58% 
Financial 13  Aa  5   ... Insurance  196  85% 
Consumer Noncyclical 1  A  5   ... Pharmaceuticals & Biotech  31  67% 
Basic Materials 2  Aa  4   ... Materials  35  68% 
Consumer Noncyclical 5  Aa  3   ... Household & Personal Products  13  56% 
Basic Materials 1  Aa  2   ... Materials  11  53% 
Energy 4  Aa  1   ... Energy  85  78% 
Communications 4  A  1   ... Technology Hardware & Equip  23  63% 
Consumer Noncyclical 6  Aa  0   ... Pharmaceuticals & Biotech  9  50% 
Total   3,170    9,127   
 
25 ANNEX 2. VaR CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE EUROSTOXX50 SAMPLE 
VaR Contribution 
All figures in EUR (normalized)  Book Value  EL 
99.0% 99.5%  99.9% 
Financial 8  172,303,071 189,533  -222,490  -30,812  67,372,534 
Financial 9  93,429,329 32,700  118,742  729,840  10,902,895 
Financial 10  68,511,472 23,979  211,638  772,246 8,462,587 
Financial 1  72,692,860 25,443  123,220  972,450 6,903,279 
Financial 12  56,872,401 19,905  167,879  887,483 5,322,734 
Financial 11  78,485,396 27,470  139,808 2,691,770  5,235,778 
Financial 15  50,165,667 17,558  254,917  908,260 5,096,058 
Financial 3  72,286,933 25,300  197,812 1,560,210  4,680,736 
Financial 14  27,701,263 30,471 1,002,932  2,271,389  3,862,672 
Communications 7  6,163,301 648,071 2,665,525  3,224,454  2,336,584 
Financial 7  35,712,331 12,499  249,728  802,680 2,131,633 
Communications 2  19,677,858 106,260 3,788,407 3,333,232  2,050,334 
Financial 6  34,481,554 12,069  251,313  780,400 2,021,112 
Consumer Cyclical 1  24,836,547 27,320 1,189,133  1,824,415  1,746,768 
Communications 3  22,253,121 120,167 4,211,880 3,259,372  1,659,779 
Financial 16  22,187,790 7,766  173,365  498,743  1,347,724 
Consumer Noncyclical 4  4,052,044 426,072 1,140,309  1,422,554  1,220,589 
Utilities 2  7,517,645 40,595 745,126 1,050,698  1,122,553 
Consumer Cyclical 3  14,316,050 15,748  530,368  882,080  912,193 
Utilities 5  10,844,955 11,929  313,958  572,094  806,999 
Financial 5  4,413,705 4,855 131,507 315,264  702,861 
Communications 1  1,815,524 190,902 635,282  827,495  670,274 
Communications 5  6,359,829 34,343 404,031  573,618 576,508 
Consumer Cyclical 2  3,902,859 21,075 275,662  438,207 511,331 
Financial 2  3,201,890 3,522  96,805  227,787  507,995 
Diversified 1  2,308,726 12,467 222,064  385,699 486,700 
Communications 6  8,382,573 9,221 220,689 375,375  443,544 
Utilities 4  9,382,458 10,321 276,950  418,347 351,705 
Energy 2  3,852,691 20,805 235,146  351,716 351,647 
Utilities 1  7,927,339 8,720 228,978 351,285  300,680 
Consumer Noncyclical 7  6,418,222 7,060 116,676 190,586  266,366 
Industrial 2  2,231,811 12,052 132,568  196,904 253,552 
Utilities 3  8,186,341 9,005 159,412 205,977  217,034 
Industrial 1  2,631,458 2,895  60,452  117,380  214,269 
Consumer Noncyclical 2  3,782,745 4,161  76,014  132,573  161,790 
Financial 4  2,572,343 2,830  51,102  87,485 150,007 
Energy 4  4,788,551 1,676  41,403  76,665 134,434 
Basic Materials 3  3,194,670 3,514  50,040  77,366 102,039 
Financial 13  1,565,941 548  11,216 28,112 80,680 
Energy 1  4,892,152 1,712  33,989  44,151  63,574 
Consumer Noncyclical 1  1,491,850 1,641  19,339  35,760  56,883 
Industrial 3  3,875,923 1,357  18,271  31,680  51,564 
Basic Materials 2  1,143,407 400  9,816  20,903 47,704 
Consumer Noncyclical 3  1,770,003 1,947  23,752  38,423  44,575 
Basic Materials 1  745,894 261  4,935  9,723  19,306 
Consumer Noncyclical 5  830,721 291  4,493  8,450  13,563 
Communications 4  177,063 195  2,137  3,546 4,633 
Consumer Noncyclical 6  130,600 46  482  895 1,476 
Energy 3  3,531,124 0  0  0  0 
Total  1,000,000,001 2,188,678  20,796,782  33,984,931 141,982,236 
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